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1.
J Infect Dis ; 225(8): 1377-1386, 2022 04 19.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32415775

RESUMEN

BACKGROUND: Environmental surveillance (ES) for poliovirus is increasingly important for polio eradication, often detecting circulating virus before paralytic cases are reported. The sensitivity of ES depends on appropriate selection of sampling sites, which is difficult in low-income countries with informal sewage networks. METHODS: We measured ES site and sample characteristics in Nigeria during June 2018-May 2019, including sewage physicochemical properties, using a water-quality probe, flow volume, catchment population, and local facilities such as hospitals, schools, and transit hubs. We used mixed-effects logistic regression and machine learning (random forests) to investigate their association with enterovirus isolation (poliovirus and nonpolio enteroviruses) as an indicator of surveillance sensitivity. RESULTS: Four quarterly visits were made to 78 ES sites in 21 states of Nigeria, and ES site characteristic data were matched to 1345 samples with an average enterovirus prevalence among sites of 68% (range, 9%-100%). A larger estimated catchment population, high total dissolved solids, and higher pH were associated with enterovirus detection. A random forests model predicted "good" sites (enterovirus prevalence >70%) from measured site characteristics with out-of-sample sensitivity and specificity of 75%. CONCLUSIONS: Simple measurement of sewage properties and catchment population estimation could improve ES site selection and increase surveillance sensitivity.


Asunto(s)
Infecciones por Enterovirus , Enterovirus , Poliomielitis , Poliovirus , Humanos , Aguas del Alcantarillado , Nigeria/epidemiología , Infecciones por Enterovirus/epidemiología , Monitoreo del Ambiente , Antígenos Virales
2.
Wellcome Open Res ; 6: 192, 2021.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-35071798

RESUMEN

Background. Genomic data is key in understanding the spread and evolution of SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and informing the design and evaluation of interventions. However, SARS-CoV-2 genomic data remains scarce across Africa, with no reports yet from the Indian Ocean islands. Methods. We genome sequenced six SARS-CoV-2 positive samples from the first major infection wave in the Union of Comoros in January 2021 and undertook detailed phylogenetic analysis. Results. All the recovered six genomes classified within the 501Y.V2 variant of concern (also known as lineage B.1.351) and appeared to be from 2 sub-clusters with the most recent common ancestor dated 30 th Oct-2020 (95% Credibility Interval: 06 th Sep-2020 to 10 th Dec-2020). Comparison of the Comoros genomes with those of 501Y.V2 variant of concern from other countries deposited into the GISAID database revealed their close association with viruses identified in France and Mayotte (part of the Comoros archipelago and a France, Overseas Department). Conclusions. The recovered genomes, albeit few, confirmed local transmission following probably multiple introductions of the SARS-CoV-2 501Y.V2 variant of concern during the Comoros's first major COVID-19 wave. These findings demonstrate the importance of genomic surveillance and have implications for ongoing control strategies on the islands.

3.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 68(38): 825-829, 2019 Sep 27.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31557146

RESUMEN

Among the three wild poliovirus (WPV) types, type 2 (WPV2) was declared eradicated globally by the Global Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication (GCC) in 2015. Subsequently, in 2016, a global withdrawal of Sabin type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) from routine use, through a synchronized switch from the trivalent formulation of oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV, containing vaccine virus types 1, 2, and 3) to the bivalent form (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3), was implemented. WPV type 3 (WPV3), last detected in 2012 (1), will possibly be declared eradicated in late 2019.* To ensure that polioviruses are not reintroduced to the human population after eradication, World Health Organization (WHO) Member States committed in 2015 to containing all polioviruses in poliovirus-essential facilities (PEFs) that are certified to meet stringent containment criteria; implementation of containment activities began that year for facilities retaining type 2 polioviruses (PV2), including type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) materials (2). As of August 1, 2019, 26 countries have nominated 74 PEFs to retain PV2 materials. Twenty-five of these countries have established national authorities for containment (NACs), which are institutions nominated by ministries of health or equivalent bodies to be responsible for poliovirus containment certification. All designated PEFs are required to be enrolled in the certification process by December 31, 2019 (3). When GCC certifies WPV3 eradication, WPV3 and vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) type 3 materials will also be required to be contained, leading to a temporary increase in the number of designated PEFs. When safer alternatives to wild and OPV/Sabin strains that do not require containment conditions are available for diagnostic and serologic testing, the number of PEFs will decrease. Facilities continuing to work with polioviruses after global eradication must minimize the risk for reintroduction into communities by adopting effective biorisk management practices.


Asunto(s)
Erradicación de la Enfermedad , Salud Global/estadística & datos numéricos , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Humanos , Poliomielitis/epidemiología
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